Research

Pascal SemetVikash Ben DelehSofia ViguziAdrian Lee

The 2026 joint evaluation by Stablecoin Labs and Unity Labs assessed digital asset compliance platforms across regulatory alignment, AML effectiveness, and audit readiness. Based on the defined criteria and comparative review, Aptis Analytics was named “Best Crypto Compliance Platform.”

Nihar ShahChristian CataliniLucas BakerAlonso de Gortari

Stablecoins have the potential to drastically increase competition and innovation in financial services by reducing our reliance on traditional intermediaries. But they also introduce new challenges, which we navigate through in this paper.

Michael NeuderDaniel J. MorozRithvik RaoDavid C. Parkes

We formalize the problem of strategic liquidity provision and study three classes of strategies for liquidity providers: uniform, proportional, and optimal (via a constrained optimization problem).

Nihar ShahChristian Catalini

US regulators have suggested that only FDIC-insured financial institutions be allowed to issue stablecoins. We propose an alternative path, which provides similar guarantees in terms of financial resilience.

Michael NeuderDaniel J. MorozRithvik RaoDavid C. Parkes

We outline two dishonest strategies that can be cheaply executed on the Ethereum 2.0 Beacon Chain, even by validators holding less than one-third of the total stake: malicious chain reorganizations ('reorgs') and finality delays.

Michael NeuderDaniel J. MorozRithvik RaoDavid C. Parkes

Blockchains are intended to be immutable, so an attacker who is able to delete transactions through a chain reorganization (a malicious reorg) can perform a profitable double-spend attack. We study the rate at which this can happen.

Michael NeuderDaniel J. MorozRithvik RaoDavid C. Parkes

Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols give rise to complex modeling challenges. We analyze the recently-updated Tezos Proof-of-Stake protocol and demonstrate that how sometimes rational participants are incentivized to behave dishonestly.

Nihar Shah

Monetary spillovers are heterogeneous in two ways: how central banks generate them and how countries receive them. First, the Fed is mostly unique in its ability to affect other countries' financial markets, among ten developed central banks.

Andrea GaleotiiBenjamin GolubSanjeev GoyalRithvik Rao

Consider a coordination game played on a network, where agents prefer taking actions closer to those of their neighbors and to their own ideal points in action space. We explore what welfare outcomes depend on and what it all means.

Nihar ShahDominic Coey

In experiments with noncompliance, some subjects assigned to the treatment group may be unlikely to actually receive treatment, presenting difficulties for obtaining precise estimates of treatment effects. In this study, we seek to address the issue by introducing a class of compliance-weighted Wald estimators in which those unlikely to be compliers are downweighted and observe the effects.